Conventional market timing is the process of switching asset classes to meet expectations about economic or sector related forecasts. This paper extends existing research by examining the risk and return outcomes of a market timing approach in which portfolios of 'Rand-play' and 'Rand-hedge' shares are switched according to fluctuations in the exchange rate.
INTRODUCTION *
Market timing is often defined as the process of shifting the weights in portfolio constituents in accordance with expected market conditions (see Jeffery 1984; Sy 1990; Sharpe 1975) . For example, during bull phases of the market, market-timers will increase the weighting of equities versus cash, and vice-versa for bear phases. Many researchers (see De Chassart and Firer, 2004; Levis and Liodakis, 1999; Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse, 1987) have shown that, whilst the potential returns of such a strategy are attractive, the success of the investor is dependent upon forecasting ability.
Generally speaking, high levels of prediction are necessary to out-perform a buy-and-hold strategy. This paper investigates a market timing strategy on the JSE related to exchange rate fluctuations in the Rand. Various researchers (see Barr, Kantor and Holdsworth, 2007; Barr and Kantor, 2005) have identified shares which react positively or negatively to exchange rate fluctuations affecting the Rand.
By increasing the weight of so-called 'Rand-hedge' shares when the Rand is expected to weaken or increasing the weight of 'Rand-play' shares when the currency is expected to strengthen, a market-timer can enhance her returnssubject to the accuracy of her currency predictions.
Using three independent sets of currency sensitive shares, this research examines the risk and return space on the JSE that would have been experienced by market-timers for different levels of predictive accuracy over the period October 1998 -October 2008.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Investors employ numerous strategies to enhance their returns, one of which is the strategy of market timing (de Chassart and Firer, 2004) . Traditional market timing is the process of switching between asset classes in anticipation of major turning points in the market. For example, Jeffrey (1984) examined the potential returns from a market timing strategy on the New York Stock Exchange for the period 1926 to 1982. He showed that perfect timing ability in switching between equities and cash would have produced a return of 10,8% above the S&P 500 return; but if all timing decisions were incorrect, the return would have dropped to 17,6% below that of the S&P 500. He concluded that the risks assumed by the market timer were not in proportion to the incremental rewards that could be gained. Firer et al. (1987) repeated Jeffrey's study on the J.S.E. They found results that were consistent with those of Jeffrey, and concluded that, on average, for perfect timing it was possible to improve returns by 18%. However, a predictive accuracy of more than 85% was required to be certain of beating the returns obtainable by simply holding the asset. For an equal probability of loss or gain relative to the buy-and-hold strategy, a forecasting accuracy of 69% was needed.
Many studies (Chua, Woodward and To, 1987; Droms, 1989; have shown that the more frequently a portfolio is reviewed, the higher are the potential rewards and the lower are the required levels of predictive accuracy. Studies in different stock markets all found that the returns that give the share market its high average returns are predisposed to occur infrequently over a small number of periods.
Conventional market timers run the risk of being out of equities at key moments (Jeffery 1984) . This important issue is captured by the adage: "it is not market timing that counts, but time in the market that M Ward* and RC Terblanche counts". Accordingly, this study proposes to examine a pure equity market timing strategy, in which switches are made between two portfolios of equities, one positively correlated to the exchange rate, and the other negatively. Adler and Dumas (1984) , in their seminal article, argue that exchange rate movements particularly impact on future cash flows of importers, exporters and multinational companies with foreign operations. Consequently, the share prices of such companies are affected by exchange rate movements to the extent that a firm's competitive landscape may be significantly altered.
Other researchers posit other factors as indicators of a firm's sensitivity to exchange rates; viz industry factors, size and competitiveness (see Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Doukas, Hall and Lang, 2003; Bodnar, Dumas and Marston, 2002) . Adler and Dumas (1984) , measure the degree, or exposure, of a firm to exchange rate movements in terms of the following regression equation:
where:
 j is the constant movement for firm j, R j is the stock return for firm j, XR is the percentage change in an exchange rate variable, defined as the home currency price of foreign currency, j is the total elasticity of firm value to the exchange rate change and  j the residual (see also Bodnar and Wong, 2003) .
Macro economic factors are not accounted for in this initial model formulation and to adjust for macroeconomic changes that can be spuriously attributed to exchange rate exposure, researchers have adjusted the model. The addition of a firm's beta to Equation 1 helps to eliminate spurious macro economic changes. The exposure model therefore is rewritten as:
 j is the exchange rate exposure elasticity of the firm and  j is the firm beta relating to the market portfolio R m is the return on the market portfolio According to Bodnar and Wong (2003) , the adjusted method developed by Adler and Dumas (1984) is the most commonly used method by researchers (see Chue and Cook, 2008; Barr, Kantor and Holdsworth, 2007; Dominguez and Tesar, 2001; Jorion, 1990) . Doidge, Griffin and Williamson (2006) note that mixed results are reported on the exchange rate exposure of firms in different developed countries. Jorion (1990) , in a study on the impact of exchange rate exposure in US Multi-national companies (MNC), finds that only 5% of the sample of 287 MNC's showed contemporaneous exposure to exchange rates. Bodnar and Gentry (1993) report higher exchange rate exposure for US firms at 23%, whilst 21% of Canadian firms and 25% of Japanese firms report exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. In contrast, Bartram and Karolyi (2006) report weak empirical evidence in nonfinancial firms in the US, Canada and Japan. Dominguez and Tesar (2006) in a study of eight non-US countries find that, in five countries, 20% of the firms exhibit exchange rate exposure and in four of these countries (viz: Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) the percentage is at 40%.
Koutmos and Martin (2003) establish that exchange rate exposure exists in firms from Germany (11%), Japan (33%), the UK (67%) and the US (44%).
In an emerging market setting Salifu, Osei and Adjasi (2007) , in their review of exchange rate exposure of listed companies on the Ghana stock exchange, report a significant exposure to the US dollar (55% of firms) and UK pound sterling (35% of firms). Similarly, Kiymaz (2003) finds that 107 of the 109 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange are sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. Dominguez and Tesar (2006) report that from the 199 Chilean firms reviewed, 86% of the firms exhibit exposure to the US dollar.
Barr and Kantor (2005) Despite all the empirical studies conducted, researchers still report mixed results on the economic significance of exchange rate exposure and the impact on firm value (see, e.g. Chue and Cook, 2008; Dominguez and Tesar, 2001; Choi and Prasad, 1995; Jorion, 1990) .
Factors such as macroeconomic shocks, country of origin, spurious relationships between exchange rate changes, specific firm value changes, placement of a firm in an industry and emerging markets' exchange rate volatility are all themes that may have contributed towards the different reported results. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) note that in instances where research indicates that (some) firms are not significantly affected by exchange rate movements, a plausible explanation may relate to currency hedging activities undertaken by firms.
The purpose of this study is to determine if a market timing strategy will outperform a buy-and-hold strategy of an appropriate index. The following null hypothesis was formulated: A strategy of market-timing, whereby a portfolio is switched between shares with positive exposure into shares with a negative exposure to exchange rate fluctuations, will not outperform the returns of buying and holding an appropriate index, at a 'reasonable level' of market timing ability.
METHODOLOGY
The first step in the methodology was to identify portfolios of 'Rand-play' and 'Rand-hedge' shares. Three approaches were used:
Firstly, the portfolios identified by Barr et al. (2007) were used (henceforth known as "BKH"). Companies in the JSE's ALSI40 index were grouped into: 'Randplay' (15 constituents) and 'Rand-hedge' (11 constituents) -see Appendix 1.
Secondly, Investec Limited (Investec, 2008) identify the constituents of their so-called "Z-share Exchange Traded Funds", one of which is a 'Rand-play' ETF (comprising 8 companies), the other a 'Rand-hedge' ETF (comprising 7 companies). Although the constituent shares in each of these ETFs does change over time, those listed on 31 May 2008 were included in this study (henceforth known as the "Investec-z" shares) -see Appendix 1.
Thirdly, a replicating portfolio approach was used to identify those shares which experienced the highest level of sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations after extracting other known effects on the JSE. Monthly returns were computed for all shares listed continuously on the JSE between 31 December 2001 and 31 May 2008.
Following the methodology of Mutooni and Muller (2007) , 12 equity style indices were constructed over the same period to isolate the size effect, the value/growth effect and the resources effect (all of which have been shown to exist on the JSE). In addition, the monthly returns of the nominal effective Rand exchange rate (NEER) were calculated. Each share was then 'regressed' against these 13 independent variables and the ten shares with the highest positive and negative weights against the NEER were identified (henceforth referred to as the "NEER" portfolio) -see Appendix 1.
Closing monthly share prices of the companies identified above were obtained from McGregorBFA, and monthly returns were calculated. Dividends were excluded.
For each of the strategies indicated above (i.e. BKH, Investec-z and NEER), a combined, equal weighted portfolio, containing the constituents of both the 'Randhedge' and the 'Rand-play' portfolios was constructed as a buy-and-hold benchmark.
The benchmark portfolios were re-balanced monthly to form three appropriate benchmark indices. In the same manner, indices were created for each of the Rand-hedge and Rand-play portfolios.
The market-timer will choose the asset portfolio where the return is maximised for the holding period. Since perfect-timing is unlikely, the potential wealth at the end of the period will be determined by two factors: the accuracy of the predictions, and the particular periods missed. The diminished returns are calculated by a multiplier factor which is used to determine the best case scenarios and worst case scenarios (Firer et al., 1987) .
The following formula was used to determine the multiplier:
where: M = multiplier; R l = lowest available return in a holding period; R h = highest available return in a holding period.
A multiplier (M) was calculated for every holding period and in turn was used to establish the best and worst case scenarios through the following formula:
W n = ending wealth after n periods with (z/n)% forecasting precision; W 100% = ending wealth after n periods with 100% forecasting precision; M z = multiplier with magnitude rank z; Z = number of periods for which an incorrect forecast was made.
To establish the best case boundary, multipliers were ranked in ascending order. To establish the worst case boundary, multipliers were ranked in descending order. The annualised returns (R pa ) were plotted against the percentage forecasting accuracy to determine the upper and lower bounds of the risk return 'playing field' first identified by Jeffrey (1984) .
RESULTS
The summary statistics for each portfolio over the period October 1998 -October 2008 are presented in Table 1 .
As can be seen from Table 1 , the Investec-z Randhedge and the BKH Rand-hedge portfolios achieve the highest value over the period (R8,23 and R7,03 respectively), although the highest (modified) Sharpe ratios related to the benchmark portfolios (i.e. the combined hedge/play shares). The BKH Rand-play portfolio had the lowest Sharpe ratio (16,2%). The NEER Rand-play portfolio produces one of the highest Sharpe ratios (22%) with the lowest beta (0,42). Figure 1 shows the performance of the portfolios over time:
From Figure 1 it is apparent that the Rand-hedge portfolios do particularly well over the 10 year review period; this is probably an artefact of the data start-up period.
It is interesting to note that the Investec-z Rand-play portfolio does particularly well over the latter half of the data. Figure 2 shows the value of a R1 investment in each of the portfolios, but after applying a perfect market timing strategy (max) and a completely incorrect market timing strategy (min). 
Figure 2: The value of correct versus incorrect timing across the portfolios
As can be seen, the Investec and BKH portfolios display similar results for perfectly correct market timers. A R1 investment given to either of these portfolios would have grown to approximately R250 over the 10 years. The downside on the BKH portfolio (resulting in a residual value of R0,08) is significantly worse than that of the Investec-z portfolio (R0,25). The NEER market timer would have achieved more modest returns; a maximum of R63 and a minimum of R0,25. By way of comparison, a R1 investment in a buy-and-hold the ALSI would have resulted in R4,09 over the review period (an annualised return of 15,1%). Figure 3 shows the market timing risk/return analysis in the form of a 'football', as described by Jeffery (1984).
As discussed above, a buy-and-hold strategy of the JSE ALSI index would have yielded an average annual return of 15,1%, with no market timing risk. However, as can be seen from Figure 3 , significantly better returns can be achieved through market timing, provided the timer is reasonably accurate in predicting exchange rate fluctuations. If we ignore the NEER results which were the least successful of the three portfolios, it is apparent that to be certain of outperforming the buy-and-hold the index return, a market timer would need to predict currency changes with an accuracy in excess of 70% (point "A"). This is perhaps an unreasonably harsh estimate, in that the market timer is equally likely to miss good periods and bad periods, in which case an accuracy level of around 35% is required (point "B") on the Investec-z portfolio. Further detail is provided in Table 2 . Table 2 highlights the risk and reward structure for market timing on exchange rate fluctuations. In this instance, the required forecasting accuracies are determined against the benchmark portfolio; which is a buy-and-hold portfolio comprising the equally weighted constituents of the Rand-hedge and Rand-play shares in each strategy.
Investors who are able to achieve high levels of accuracy are likely to achieve returns that exceed the benchmark by up to 50%. This result is significantly higher than other researchers.
Ahmed, Lockwood and Nanda (2002) reported returns in excess of 37%, Levis and Liodakis (1999) reported an excess of 17,4% whilst Firer et al. (1987) reported excess returns of 18% -once again, these related to conventional timing.
As illustrated earlier, high levels of predictive accuracy (above 75%) are necessary to be certain of outperforming. However, to have an equal chance of out-performing, accuracy levels of around 50% are required, and this drops as low as 40% for the Investec-z portfolio. These findings concur with those of Ahmed et al. (2002) , Levis and Liodakis (1999) , Firer et al. (1987) and Jeffrey (1984) who reported similar levels of accuracy required to exceed benchmarks, although it must be noted that these studies related to conventional market timing, and not to fluctuating exchange rates. To further assess the risk of market timing, researchers have applied other measures. Firer et al. (1987) calculated the percentage number of switches required to achieve the maximum return against the total number of periods in which the investment was held. Jeffery (1984) defined a 'compression ratio', by establishing the number of periods in which the most significant returns are generated (and which can therefore not be missed) expressed as a percentage of the number of holding periods. Portfolios with low compression ratios are more risky as these represent fewer, more significant periods, that 'cannot be missed'. See Table 3 below. Table 3 indicates that, for the Investec-z market timing strategy for example, around 22% of the periods comprise those months where the importance of being in a particular portfolio is most critical. If the investor misses these specific months, she cannot beat a buyand-hold strategy even if she correctly times the remaining 78%. From Table 3 it can be seen that the Investec-z strategy is therefore less risky than the others.
A further consideration is that of transaction costs incurred when portfolios are switched. Transaction costs vary with the value of the transaction, and with the type of instrument used. For small deals transaction costs could be as higher than 2%, whereas for large transactions, or through the use of derivatives, transaction costs would be less than 0,5%. For purposes of this study, transaction costs were established conservatively at 0,98% (Standard Bank, 2008 ). An optimal timing strategy, with a monthly review period, requires approximately 55 (45%) switches to achieve maximum returns. Although the actual cost of the transaction is fixed, the timing of the transaction determines the impact on the overall return. In the case of the BKH portfolio, for instance, the inclusion of transaction costs at 0,98% reduces the return on investment from 75% to almost 64%. Although this is a significant reduction, the performance still remains in excess of 35% from the benchmark.
The impact of transaction costs is obviously related to the frequency of the review period.
Given this consideration, the findings for this study are in line with those of Jeffrey (1984) , who reports (using quarterly review periods) that transaction costs will reduce the ending portfolio value by approximately 13%. Firer et al. (1987) set transaction cost at 1,38% and report a reduction in potential average annual return of only 5% whilst the required forecasting accuracy increases by 6%. Levis and Liodakis (1999) report that transaction costs of 1% result in a 5% drop in returns.
CONCLUSIONS
The research highlights the potential risks and returns relating to a market timing approach in which portfolios of equities are switched according to fluctuations in the exchange rate over the period October 1998 to October 2008. The analysis suggests that a market timing strategy may generate returns of up to 35% in excess of traditional buy and hold strategies for accurate market timers.
Shares with a positive rand exchange rate exposure contribute more frequently to maximum returns than shares with negative exchange rate exposure. This is consistent with the performance of the Rand over the past six years, in which the Rand was (mostly) stable against major foreign currencies.
The feasibility of a market timing strategy is dependent upon prediction ability.
To be certain of outperformance, a market timer must be able to forecast currency fluctuations correctly 75% of the time. However, the level of predictive accuracy can drop to around 40% to equal a buy and hold strategy, if one assumes an equal chance of missing good verses bad periods. These findings reject the null hypothesis that market timing, based on exchange rate movements, will not outperform the returns of buying and holding an appropriate index, at a 'reasonable level' of market timing ability.
The excess returns found in this study are significantly higher than returns presented in previous studies, whilst the risks are similar.
Furthermore, other researchers have found that shorter review periods can enhance out-performance (see Chua et al. 1987; Droms, 1989; , and transaction costs can be reduced through derivatives (see Waksman et al., 1997) . These factors may improve the possible benefits arising from timing exchange rate fluctuations. 
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